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COMMENTS

A Divided Country in Foreign Courts-Recent Litigation
Involving Germany's Legal Status and the
Zeiss Stiftung
The partition of countries in the wake of the second World War
accounts for two Asian battlefields: Korea and Viet Nam. In Europe,
where a dividing line was drawn through Germany, military hostilities have been avoided thus far. Instead, the controversies originating from that line are fought out at the conference table, through
public and private media ·of communication, and in the courthouses.
I.

CARL ZEISS STIFTUNG

Many of the fighting issues are reflected and squarely presented
in the countless cases relating to a single enterprise: the Zeiss
Stiftung.1 Although the issues in each of these cases are necessarily
varied, the gist of all of them is identical and can be easily stated
in a few words: who is entitled to use the name "Zeiss" or "Carl
Zeiss" as a business name or trade-mark? Two groups of persons, one
East German, the other West German, are in violent conflict over
this right, each claiming to represent the Carl Zeiss Stiftung. Originally, that organization had its legal domicile in Jena where it was
established in 1889, with its charter being ratified in 1896. At the
end of World War II, Thuringia, the province in which Jena is
situated, was occup'ied by American forces. However, shortly thereafter, pursuant to agreements with the Soviet Union, the Americans
withdrew and Jena became part of East Germany.2 The leading
officers of the Zeiss Stiftung as well as several of its employees went
to West Germany when the Americans left, taking with them im1. Under German law, a Stiftung (foundation) is a legal entity administering a
conglomeration of assets. After establishment, it is treated as a legal person owning
the property under its administration; but unlike a corporation it has no shareholders
or any kind of members. See 1 MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 38 (Foreign Office ed. 1950).
The Zeiss Stiftung is unusual in that it owns sizeable economic enterprises, whereas
ordinarily a Stiftung is either used for purposes of family settlement or for charitable
or scientific purposes. On the history, the legal nature of the Zeiss Stiftung, and the
philosophy on which it rests, see DAVID, DIE CARL-ZEISS-SllFTIJNG, IHRE VERGANCENHEIT
UND IHRE GEGENWAERTIGE RECHTUCHE LAGE (1954); Mayer, The Zeiss Foundation, 10
J. PUB. L. 384 (1961 ).
2. This action conformed to the Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the "Greater :Berlin" Area, Sept. 12, 1944, adopted by the European Advisory
Commission. See DocuMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, at 1 (United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations ed. 1961). See also excerpts from the correspondence
between President Truman and Marshal Stalin on the withdrawal of western troops
and their movement into :Berlin in DOCUMENTS ON :BERLIN 1943-1963, at 23-24 (Heidelmeyer & Hindrichs eds. 1963).
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portant documents, such as patents, drawings, and files. 3 With the
aid of those documents, and by making use of the Stiftung's interests
in West German enterprises, these persons began to conduct a business in West Germany and, after a short period, they began to use the
name "Zeiss" for their products and their enterprise. They purported to modify the basic instrument governing the Stiftung, the
so-called Stiftungsstatut (Charter), so as to make the West German
city of Heidenheim the domicile of the Stiftung.4
Meanwhile, the authorities exercising power in East Germany
appointed new officers for the Stiftung. In 1948, two enterprises
situated in Jena and owned by the Stiftung were confiscated and
became so-called "People's Owned Enterprises." The Stiftung, however, was not dissolved or nationalized. On the contrary, the East
German authorities purported to keep it alive and issued a statement
to the effect that the nationalized enterprises would have certain
rights and obligations vis-a-vis the Stiftung which would be determined by a revised Stiftungsstatut.5
II.

LITIGATION OVER THE USE OF THE NAME "ZEISS"

The stage was thus set for the world-wide controversy between
two rival organizations over the legitimate use of the five letters
forming the profit-boosting name "Zeiss." In this country, an action
involving the Stiftung has been pending for many years, but it
appears to be still in the pre-trial stage.6 In Great Britain, a case was
brought more than 10 years ago, yet it was not until May of 1966
that the House of Lords decided the preliminary issue of whether
the East German plaintiff could authorize an action in a British
court despite the British government's non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (the East German state). 7 In Switzerland,
a suit was started in 1962 and decided by the Bundesgericht, the
highest court of that country, in 1965.8 Germany itself is, of course,
the country with the greatest incidence of "Zeiss" litigation. The
3. For details, see Mayer, supra note 1, at 400.
4. Actually this flies in the face of the charter which provides in article 3 that
Jena shall be the Stiftung's domicile and in article 121 that this rule (and others)
may not, under any circumstances, be changed. For arguments in support of the
change of domicile despite the language of those provisions, see Nipperdey, Die
Rechtslage der Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung und der Firma Carl Zeiss seit 1945, in FESTSCHRIFT
WALn:R. SCHMIDT-RIMPLER. 41, 53-61 (1957).
5. For more detailed statements of facts, see cases cited notes 7-10 infra.
6. Letter From Isaac Shapiro of Milbank, Tweed, Hadly 8: McCloy, New York, to
the author, Sept. 28, 1966. The action was commenced in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in February 1962, and discovery has
been in progress ever since.
7. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner 8: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125
(H.L.) [hereinafter referred to as the Zeiss case or the English Zeiss case].
8. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firma Carl Zeiss Heidenheim, Bundesgericht, March 30,
1965, 91 II Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes 117 (Switz.).
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decisions rendered by West German courts are innumerable; 9 for
East Germany, the matter was settled by a decision of its highest
court in 1961.10 Several other countries have had their share of
"Zeiss" litigation.

A. The English Court of Appeal and the Doctrine
of Recognition
As the brief narrative above indicates, these controversies inevitably present courts with one or more of the intricate questions
relating to Germany's post-war status as a defeated and occupied
country which, after 20 years of gradual transformation, is still only
semi-independent and divided.11 The most extensive, and in some
respects the most startling, discussion of these questions is to be
found in the opinions rendered in the English Zeiss case.12 That
case was brought by persons in East Germany purporting to act for
the Stiftung itself, not for the nationalized enterprises which formerly belonged to the Stiftung. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction against the use of the name "Zeiss" by the West German group
and its two English retailers. The defendants raised an objection on
the ground that the action was begun and maintained without the
authority of the Stiftung. While the trial judge overruled this objection, the Court of Appeal accepted it after receiving a certificate from
the Foreign Secretary to the effect that "Her Majesty's Government
have not granted any recognition de jure or de facto to (a) the
'German Democratic Republic' or (b) its Government.''13 In view
9. The most important cases are: Judgment of July 24, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof,
1954-57 Sammlung der deutschen Entscheidungen zum interzonalen Privatrecht
[hereinafter cited as IzRsPR.] No. 222 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of Jan. 28, 1958,
Bundesgerichtshof, 1958-59 IzRsPR. No. 60 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of Nov. 15, 1960,
Bundesgerichtshof, 1960-61 IzRsPR. No. 52 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); Judgment of June 30,
1961, Bundesgerichtshof, 1960-61 IzRsPR. No. 136 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
IO. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Firma Carl Zeiss in Oberkochen/Wuerttemberg, Oberstes
Gericht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, March 23, 1961, 8 Entscheidungen
des Obersten Gerichts der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Zivilsachen 208
(Ger. Dem. Rep.).
11. The United States, Britain, and France recognized West Germany as having
"the fnll authority of a sovereign State." See Convention on Relations between the
Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, art. 1(2), 6
U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 4251, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, as amended by the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954,
6 U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 4121, T.I.A.S. No. 3425. However, under article 2 of the Convention,
as amended, the three former occupation powers "retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as
a whole." For an analysis, see BLUMENWITZ, DIE GRUNDLAGEN EINES FRIEDENSVERTRAGES
MIT DEUTSCHLAND 108-12 (1966); Bishop, The "Contractual Agreements" with the
Federal Republic of Germany, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 125 (1955). With respect to East
Germany, similarly contradictory declarations have been made by the Soviet Union.
See BLUMENWITZ, op. cit. supra at 112-15.
12. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125
(H.L.).
13. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), {1965] I Ch. 596, 637 (C.A.
1964).
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of this certificate, the appellate court held that it could not give effect
to the acts which authorized plaintiff's solicitors to bring the action.14
Why was the recognition point relevant to a disposition of the
case? Supposedly, since the City of Berne v. Bank of England, 15 the
English courts have adhered to the doctrine that they cannot take
notice of a state or a government which is not recognized by their
own government and that they must ignore all acts of whatever
nature emanating from such state or government. Yet in this case
the action was brought neither by an unrecognized government nor
by a legal entity created under the laws of such a government.
Rather, the plaintiff Stiftung had been incorporated long before
Germany was divided into two states.16 Consequently, the theory
espoused by the defendants and accepted by the Court of Appeal is
not that the existence of the Stiftung must be disregarded altogether.
Rather, it rests on two provisions of the Stiftungsstatut which link in
a peculiar way the management of the Stiftung to the political
authorities governing Thuringia. These provisions are to a large
extent the nub of the case and account for the fact that it presents so
many of Germany's politico-legal problems in a nutshell. In order to
fully understand these crucial provisions, it must be kept in mind
that at the time they were drafted, Jena belonged to the Grand
Duchy of Saxe-Weimar which became a part of the "Land" of
Thuringia when that body was created in 1918. In article 5 of the
Zeiss Stiftungsstatut, it is provided that that department of the Grand
Duchy which supervises the University of Jena should function,
under the name of "Stiftungsverwaltung," as the governing board of
the Stiftung.17 In addition, article 5 authorizes the Stiftungsverwaltung to appoint a person to act as its permanent agent (the "Stiftungskommissar") who must be chosen from among the high state
officials of the Grand Duchy. Due to some remarkable foresight,
article 113 of the Stiftungsstatut provided for the contingency that
political changes rendering article 5 unworkable might occur. It
states that, if there is a department in Thuringia controlling the
University of Jena, it will act as Stiftungsvenvaltung; othenvise this
function will be exercised by "the highest administrative authority
in Thuringia."18 Quite obviously, the plaintiff had to invoke article
113 in order to establish valid authorization of its solicitors since the
Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar is a matter of fairy-tale past. Plaintiff's
14. Id. at 651, 662.
15. 9 Ves. 347, 32 Eng. Rep. 636 (Ch. 1804).
16. See p. 924 supra.
17. For a translation of article 5 of the Stiftungsstatut, see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965) I Ch. 596, 601 (C.A. 1964). Since the Court of
Appeal felt that the translation is rather inadequate, id. at 639, the reader may want
to check the German original which is reproduced in Nipperdey, supra note 4, at 42.
18. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965] I Ch. 596, 602
(C.A. 1964), for a translation of article 113 of the Stiftungsstatut, the German text of
which is reproduced in Nipperdey, supra note 4, at 42.
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position would have been much easier, if, at least, the Land Thuringia were still in existence, but in 1952 the government of the
German Democratic Republic abolished the Land and replaced it
by three smaller units (Bezirke) each headed by a council (Rat).19
Thus, there is no "highest administrative authority" having power
over all of Thuringia. The only body to which plaintiff could point
as Stiftungsverwaltung, and which in fact exercises that function, is
the Council of Gera. 20 The Council governs that part of Thuringia
in which Jena lies and may therefore be said to meet the description
in article 113, although it is a creature of the German Democratic
Republic-a state which is not recognized by the British government. This last consideration prompted the Court of Appeal to
refuse to take cognizance of the Council's existence and of the act by
which it had authorized the bringing of an action in England. Hence
the importance of the recognition issue.
B. The House of Lords and East Germany as an
Agent of the Soviet Union

Whether the Court of Appeal's approach to the issue is sound
seems questionable. As one commentator said, the decision is singularly devoid of policy arguments. 21 But it has, at least, the merit of
being straight-forward in its adherence to a supposedly settled, albeit
doubtful, doctrine.22 The House of Lords, on the other hand, while
paying lip-service to the doctrine, tried to avoid its consequences in
a rather circuitous and hardly convincing fashion. The hard core of
the holding by the House of Lords is that the existence of the
Council of Gera and its functioning as Stiftungsverwaltung can and
19. This reorganization took place on the basis of a "Law Relating to the Further
Democratization of the Organization and the Working Method of Public Authorities
in the Laender of the German Democratic Republic," passed on July 23, 1952 (1952
GESETZBLATI' DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBUK 613).
20. Pursuant to § 4(a) of the statute refened to in the preceding note, the functions
previously exercised by the Laender were transfened to the authorities of the Bezirke.
21. Note, The Laws of Unrecognized Governments in the English Courts: The
Carl Zeiss Stiftung Case, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 311, 319 (1966).
22. Counsel for plaintiff in the English Zeiss case argued, inter alia, that American
courts have not applied the doctrine as rigidly as the English courts purport to do.
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125, 138
(H.L.). The most recent comprehensive discussion of the American attitude will be
found in Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright v.
Mercury Business Machines, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 275 (1962). In England, a more flexible
approach, along the lines taken by American courts, has been advocated by Greig, The
Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognized Government in English Law, 83
L.Q. REv. 96, 128-38 (1967); and Lipstein, Recognition of Governments and the Application of Foreign Laws, 35 THE GROTIUS SOCIETY: TRANSACTIONS FOR nm YEAR 1949, 157,
183-87 (1950). The Greig article questions rather persuasively whether the authorities
prior to Luther v. Sagar, [1921] I K.B. 456, really stand for the proposition that English
courts will not give any effect to the acts of an unrecognized government. See id. at
105-11.
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must be given effect in an English forum. This holding, however, is
not based on the theory that a legally significant situation in a
foreign country must sometimes be taken into account, even though
it was created by a non-recognized regime. Rather, it rests on the
assumption that the acts of the German Democratic Republic are
acts by an agent of the Soviet Union-a recognized state. To be sure,
at one point in his opinion, Lord Reid endeavors to express frankly
his dissatisfaction with the implication of the approach taken by the
Court of Appeal. 23 But suddenly, he seems to become horrified by
the prospect of being compelled to re-examine the venerable doctrine and takes refuge by adopting a theory which supposedly saves
the court from this task. In his view, the judges of the lower court
misunderstood the true import of the information they received from
the Foreign Secretary.24 In a second certificate, the Secretary had
stated that the British government has recognized, from the end of
the war to the date of the certificate (November 6, 1964), the state
and government of the Soviet Union as de jure entitled to exercise
governing authority with respect to the zone allocated to it by agreements with the Western allies. After emphasizing the joint authority
of the four powers in matters affecting Germany as a whole, which
authority was exercised for a period of time by the Control Council
for Germany, the certificate asserted: "Her Majesty's Government
have not recognized either de jure or de facto any other authority
purporting to exercise governing authority in or in respect of the
zone. " 25 The Court of Appeal, far from disregarding this part of the
information, had discussed it at great length. It had found that
the certificate did not prevent it from taking notice of the fact that
the Soviet Union, which was entitled to exercise governing authority
in its zone, had in effect ceased to do so by setting up the German
Democratic Republic and eventually recognizing it as a sovereign
state.26 The House of Lords considered this conclusion impermissible. Lord Reid opines the certificate precluded any finding that the
German Democratic Republic is a sovereign state; therefore he
thinks it must be treated as an organization subordinate to the Soviet
Union, whose acts are valid as acts of an agent of the Soviet Union. 27
Three other members of the court concur without adding any
further arguments. The fifth judge, Lord Wilberforce, also con23. Carl Z~ Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125,
137-38 (H.L.). Lord Wilberforce also voiced misgivings about the "legal vacuum"
which, according to the Court of Appeal, exists in the territory of East Germany.
See id. at 177.
24. Id. at 135.
25. Carl Z~ Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1965] 1 Ch. 596, 637-38
(C.A. 1964).
26. Id. at 651.

27. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner&: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125,
136 (H.L.).
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curring, refers to Brierly's The Law of Nations, 28 where it is said
that a recognizing state is not concerned with the question whether
the state of affairs which it is recognizing is legal by the national
law of another state. In his Lordship's view, this principle would be
violated if the English courts were to take account of the fact that
the Soviet Union considers the government of the German Democratic Republic as independent. 29 Lord Wilberforce also discusses
the fact that the second certificate fails to state that the Soviet Union
is de facto exercising governing authority in East Germany. This, he
says, must not be interpreted as allowing an inference that there is
some other body with de facto authority independent of the Soviet
Union, since the certificate expressly negates recognition of any
other authority, de facto or de jure, by the British Government.30
III. THE RECOGNIZED REGIME AND Loss OF ACTUAL CONTROL
With due respect, the logic of neither of the opinions rendered
by Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce is exactly what one might call
compelling. For one thing, both judges fail to appreciate fully the
peculiar legal situation of an occupation regime. Neglecting this
aspect for the moment, their reasoning seems to be questionable even
if it were applied to a non-occupied country. It is generally accepted
that a government recognized by the forum as a de jure government
over a certain territory can lose actual control over part or all of it by
a revolution or by intervention from outside. In such a situation, acts
emanating from the revolutionary forces or the intervenor will
certainly not be recognized by a foreign government as acts of the
de jure government unless the de jure government gives them
effect after regaining control or it reaches an agreement with the
intervenor.31
Whether such acts can be recognized at all depends on the attitude a court takes when it is confronted with acts of a non-recognized
authority. If it looks to its own executive for guidance, as the English
courts profess to do, it will treat them as nullities as long as its
government has not given at least de facto recognition to the new
regime. Conceding this to be the settled practice, both Lord Reid
and Lord Wilberforce distinguish the present case on the ground
that the German Democratic Republic was set up with the consent
of the Soviet Union rather than by revolution.32 One need not go so
28. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 147 (6th ed. 1963).
29. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125,
180 (H.L.).
30. Ibid.
31. 1 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (1965); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1965).
32. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966] 3 Weekly L.R. 125,
135-37, 178-79 (H.L.).
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far as to call this a distinction without a difference and still be at a
loss to understand why the distinction was required or even suggested by the Foreign Secretary's certificate, as the House of Lords
appears to assume. The certificate only states that the British government has not recognized, either de jure or de facto, any authority
in East Germany other than the Soviet Union (and for some purposes, the Control Council).33 This statement is a far cry from saying,
as the House of Lords did say, that every governmental act carried
out in that territory must be attributed to the authority of the Soviet
Union. In the revolution and intervention situations, exactly the
opposite would follow: only acts which are in fact acts of the de jure
government would be given effect in an English court. Why should
an authority, previously recognized as the de jure power over a
certain territory, be held to be the author of acts performed by a
successor authority when the succession occurred peacefully but not
when it occurred by force? The many instances, after World War II,
in which European countries have terminated their colonial regimes
in Asia and Africa seem to suggest that peaceful consensual creation
of an independent regime is frequently motivated by the desire to
avoid a revolution which would have brought about such independence. Thus there is a functional proximity, if not identity, of the
two occurrences which obviously militates against a different treatment as to their legal consequences in a foreign court. This approach
supports the position of the Court of Appeal which believed that it
was entitled to take notice of the termination of actual control over
a certain territory by a government recognized by the forum as the
de jure authority in that territory, regardless of whether termination
is due to a revolution against, or to consent by, the former sovereign.
Is it true, as Lord Wilberforce alleges, that the view taken by the
Court of Appeal in cases where authority over some territory is
terminated by consent violates the principle expressed by Brierly?
Careful reading of Brierly's exposition reveals that the reference to
his book is beside the point. He discusses the question whether
recognition de jure requires that the recognized state of affairs be
legally created. In this context, he dismisses the proposition that
legality under the national law of another state is necessary, 34 thereby
taking a generally accepted position which, however, has nothing to
do with the problem at hand. Lord Wilberforce should not even
have cited Brierly's statement as authority for the principle that a
recognizing state can treat as irrelevant the view taken by another
state as to the legal or factual situation in any territory. Given the
decentralized nature of the recognition process under current international law, that principle can hardly be debated. Yet, again, it is a
!l!I. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
!14• .BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 147.
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different matter from the problem with which Brierly is concerned.
Moreover, the principle that recognition by one state of another is
res inter alios acta for a third state would hardly argue against the
position of the Court of Appeal. It is not correct to say that the Court
of Appeal treated an authority that has been recognized by the Soviet
Union as recognized by Britain; such an attitude, or one closely
approximating it, would clearly conflict with the Foreign Secretary's
certificate. The Court of Appeal merely viewed recognition by the
Soviet Union of the German Democratic Republic as a fact showing
loss of actual control over the latter's territory and thus equivalent to
the breaking away of a territory from a de jure government's control
by revolution. 85
How does this approach square with the language of the certificate? Defendants went so far as to allege that the Court of Appeal's
conclusion was in fact suggested by the deliberate and significant
abstention in the certificate from any positive assertion to the effect
that the Soviet Union was de facto exercising governing authority
or control in the Eastern Zone. Rejecting this argument, Lord
Wilberforce correctly pointed out that de jure recognition is generally the fullest recognition which can be given,36 and that therefore
it is erroneous to attach any weight to the absence of a statement in
the certificate confirming de facto recognition of Soviet authority in
East Germany. While it is appropriate to say that a certain regime
has not been recognized, either de facto or de jure, a statement that a
regime has been recognized de jure as well as de facto is redundant.
The defendants were obviously misled by the term "de facto recognition," which is notorious for its confusing quality. Used accurately,
it means only recognition of a limited character. The qualifications
to which it is subject depend upon the circumstances and the intention of the recognizing state, but most frequently it is limited in
terms of finality in that it is provisional rather than definitive. 37
35. While the Foreign Secretary's certificate would not seem to preclude this finding, see p. 933 infra, it is at least questionable whether the Soviet Union's declarations
warrant the far-reaching conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeal. Loss of actual
control is a question of fact, not a matter of mere declarations. In 1954, the allied
representatives in West Germany found that the actual situation in East Germany
had not been altered by the Soviet statement of March 25, 1954, purporting to grant
sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic. See Joint Declaration by the Allied
High Commission, on the Status of East Germany, April 8, 1954, DocuMENTS ON
GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, ·at 154. In support of the Court of Appeal, it might
be argued that the East German situation in 1964, when the court decided the case,
was probably different from what it was ten years before. However, there is seemingly
no evidence on which such a finding could be based. Furthermore, the East German
statute whose effect is at issue in the Zeiss case was enacted in 1952. See note 19 supra
and accompanying text. Thus, conceivably, the factual situation in 1952 may be deemed
controlling.
36. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner &: Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1966) 3 Weekly L.R. 125
180 (H.L.).
37. :BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 147; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 74,
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Since recognition cannot be at the same time limited and complete,
it is of no avail to point to the absence of de facto recognition once
de jure recognition has been given. On the other hand, recognition
of a state as well as of a government is generally held to require a
certain effectiveness and stability of the new regime; an act of recognition where these requirements are not met is considered an international wrong. 38 Thus, a court can safely entertain a presumption
of actual control over a certain territory by a new regime to which
the forum's government has granted de jure recognition unless this
act has been superseded by subsequent de jure or de facto recognition of another regime in the same territory or in any part of it.
However, the situation in the Zeiss case is one in which the
forum's government certified that it had recognized de jure an authority established some fifteen years ago and had not given recognition to any other state or government respecting the same territory:
does the language of this certificate exclude the possibility of finding
that the de jure authority lost actual control over that territory?
Plainly not, since even though actual control can be presumed to
have existed at the time recognition was first granted, it need not
have continued to the present time. A new regime which is not even
recognized de facto may in fact have replaced the one still recognized
by the forum. It is suggested that an English court would not be unfaithful to precedent if it were to take notice of this state of affairs by
disregarding the acts of the new, unrecognized regime, rather than
by entertaining the fiction of attributing such acts to the recognized
authority.39 If the policy underlying the English precedents is to
avoid embarrassment for the executive and also not to defeat the
purposes for which the course of non-recognition is pursued, the
attitude of the Court of Appeal seems to effectuate this policy much
better than does that of the House of Lords. In this context, it must
at 136 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 31, § 96, Reporters' Note 2(a) (1965). See also the statement by the British Foreign Secretary in
the House of Commons on March 21, 1951, outlining the British practice; it is reproduced in BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 28, at 148 n.2 .
.!18. 1 O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra note .!II, at 143, 148; TEUSCHER, DIE VORZEITIGE
ANERKENNUNG IM VoELKERRECHT 61 (1959); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 31,
§ 99(2) •
.!19. In effect, this would seem to be a logical extension of the position taken in
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori, (1937] I Ch. 513, and in
Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha, [1938] 2 K.B. 176 (C.A. 1938). In both cases, it was held
that acts carried out by a recognized de facto government in the territory under its
control prevail over conflicting acts of the government still recognized de jure with
respect to the same territory. The Foreign Office certificate received by the court in
the Banco de Bilbao case seems to have been somewhat ambiguous in that it stated
only that General Franco's Nationalist regime was recognized as exercising effective
administrative control in parts of Spain. The court, however, interpreted this to imply
recognition of Franco's regime as a (de facto) government. For a comment, see I
O'CoNNELL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 174, 198-99, 203. Thus, the situation borders on
the one discussed in the text.
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be kept in mind that withdrawal of de jure recognition unaccompanied by recognition of a new regime has a very doubtful standing
in international law. 40 The prevailing opinion appears to deny this
type of revocability, although "pure" revocation has occasionally
occurred in actual state practice.41 In a situation where a government
is not prepared to recognize a new regime that has in fact replaced
the previously recognized authority in part or all of its territory, the
government can hardly certify to a court the actual state of affairs in
that territory because to do so might imperil its non-recognition
attitude. At any rate, in the Zeiss case, the Foreign Office was not
requested to express its views about the real situation in East Germany; it was merely consulted about its own acts of recognition.
Under these circumstances, the alleged conflict between the Court
of Appeal's attitude and the language of the certificate, far from
being obvious, is more likely to be a chimera.

IV.

GERMANY UNDER ALLIED OCCUPATION

Turning now to the special problems of the occupation regime
in Germany, it must be noted at the outset that the analysis advanced
by the House of Lords has a striking resemblance to a theory developed by the late John Foster Dulles in his capacity as Secretary of
State at an historic news conference some eight years ago. At that
time, the Soviet Union had launched the second major Berlin crisis
and was in fact denouncing certain obligations and the corresponding rights of the Western allies which are stated in agreements between the four powers, entered into at the conclusion of World
War II. 42 In response to questions relating to the possible reaction
of the United States in case the Soviets should turn over to the
German Democratic Republic the control of traffic to and from
Berlin, Mr. Dulles indicated that the East German authorities might
be dealt with as agents of the Soviet Union but that they would not
be accepted as a substitute for the Soviet Union in discharging the
latter's obligations.43 Despite their kinship there is of course an important difference between Mr. Dulles' theory of agency and the
position of the House of Lords which views the German Democratic
Republic as an organization subordinate to the Soviet Union. While
Mr. Dulles was concerned with the vindication of Western rights of
access to and egress from Berlin and thus with very specific and
narrowly defined issues, the House of Lords deals with the general
40. 1 O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 173-77; 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra
note 37, § 75g, at 150•52; REsTATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra note 31, § 96.
41. 1 O'CONNELL, op. dt. supra note 31, at 173 n.10.
42. See Note From the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Ambassador at
Moscow, Nov. 27, 1958, in DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 348.
43. See DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 343-45.
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legal status of East Germany. Assuming without inquiry that the
Western allies have certain rights with respect to Berlin and that the
Soviet Union owes corresponding obligations, it is obvious that in
the absence of consent by the West, those rights cannot be terminated nor the obligations transferred to the German Democratic
Republic. 44 Hence the doctrine of agency: the actual replacement of
Soviet Union officials exercising control over traffic to and from
Berlin by East German officials would not be allowed to operate as
a substitution of a new obligor; rather, the Soviet Union would continue to be held responsible, with the German Democratic Republic
functionaries acting as its agents. This makes reasonably good sense
once the premise is accepted that, under international law as well as
under domestic law, an obligor cannot escape his duties by virtue of
transactions with a third party to which the obligee has not agreed.
The House of Lords, however, appears to have gone much further
than that. Having determined that because the British government
has not recognized the German Democratic Republic, he is precluded from viewing it as a sovereign state, Lord Reid concluded
that the East German regime must necessarily be exercising power
derived from, and therefore attributable to, the Soviet Union. 45 It is
submitted that this conclusion is not well-founded in that it takes
the dichotomy of wholly independent power ("sovereign state") and
wholly derivative power ("subordinate organization") to be all-inclusive. This somewhat crude approach probably does not fit any
occupation regime and is certainly inapplicable to the one established in Germany after World War II.
Under the general law of warfare, an occupant has power to
legislate and to take certain other actions in the territory under its
control, which means, of course, that the occupied country lacks
complete self-determination and is thus not absolutely independent.
On the other hand, the occupant's power is generally held to be
limited.46 Consequently, all acts emanating from the domestic authorities of the occupied country and relating to matters beyond
the reach of the occupant, are home-grown acts so to speak, since
by hypothesis they cannot be attributed to the occupant's power.
The German situation is complicated primarily by two factors.
First, although Germany's occupation was the result of wartime
military actions, it has considerably outlasted the cessation of active
44. To the same effect is the Statement by the Department of State on Legal Aspects of the Berlin Situation, Dec. 20, 1958, DocuMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra
note 2, at 367, 373.
45. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
46, See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T .S. No. 403. For a discussion and reference to further
material, see McDOUGAL &: FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER 744-71
(1961).
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hostilities and is therefore more than an ordinary occupatio bellica.
Second, from the inception of their occupation regime, the allied
forces have claimed to possess, and have in fact exercised, larger
powers in Germany than would have been granted them under the
general rules of warfare.47 In a declaration issued June 5, 1945, less
than a month after the unconditional surrender of the German
forces, the Allies stated that no central government existed in Germany and that the governments of the United States, the Soviet
Union, Britain, and France therefore assumed supreme authority
with respect to Germany, including the powers possessed by the
German government and any state, municipal, or local government
or authority.48 The assumption of said authority and powers, however, was not to be construed to effect the annexation of Germany. 49
The same day, the Allied Statement on Control Machinery in Germany promulgated the rule that during the period in which Germany was carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender, supreme authority in Germany would be exercised by the
Commanders-in-Chief, each in his zone of occupation, and jointly
through the Control Council in matters affecting Germany as a
whole. 50 In actual practice, the military governments in the four
zones of occupation were never complete in the sense of a machinery
which could wholly replace the domestic German authorities. Rather,
German municipal and local governments more or less continued
to function and were merely placed under allied supervision which
sought to ensure that active Nazi personnel were removed and that
the occupation laws and the orders of occupation authorities were
given effect. Gradually, even at the higher levels of state and regional government, German authorities were set up again, and at
all levels the scope of activities within which German authorities
were allowed to function was constantly, albeit slowly, extended.51
The practice thus pursued in all four zones was consistent with the
"Political Principles" accepted by the heads of government of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain at their Berlin (Potsdam) Conference in 1945 and set forth in the protocol of the meeting. 52 Only that part of the "Principles" which provided for the
establishment of certain essential central German administrative
47. See McDOUGAL &: FELICIANO, supra note 46, at 768-70; 2 OPPENHEIM, INTER·
NATIONAL LAW § 265a (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
48. See DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 12.
49. Preamble, para. 5, last sentence of the Declaration of June 5, 1945, DOCUMENTS
ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 13.
50. DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, supra note 2, at 19.
51. For details, see FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
58-61, 70-88, 100-09 (1947).
52. Protocol of the Proceedings of the :Berlin Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, Part II A9,
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, at 29 (United States Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations ed. 1961).
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departments was not carried out. 53 In direct proportion to the growing tension between East and West, both sides created separate
central organizations, each of which began to act as a German state,
eventually to be recognized as being "sovereign" in its territory
by different parts of the international community.54 However, while
the Federal Republic of Germany received recognition by the Soviet
Union as well as by the Western nations, the German Democratic
Republic is not recognized by any but the Communist countries.
V.

INADEQUACY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS RATIONALE

The foregoing brief outline of the German post-war development in conjunction with the above considerations regarding an
occupation regime in general should suffice to make it clear that
the House of Lords in the Zeiss case was rather rash in concluding
that Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union as de jure authority
in East Germany required the British courts to treat acts of the
German Democratic Republic as acts of an agent of the Soviet
Union and therefore valid. First, the court should have examined
more closely the precise meaning of Britain's "recognition" of the
Soviet Union's de jure authority with respect to East Germany. As
mentioned above, the four powers which formed the occupation
regime in Germany expressly disclaimed an annexation. 55 Consequently, the Soviet zone of Germany was never recognized as a part
of the Soviet Union's own territory. Furthermore, one would surmise that recognition of the Soviet authority in East Germany did
not mean recognition of a new state since the manner in which the
control machinery in Germany was set up (with the Control Council
in charge of all "matters affecting Germany as a whole") expresses
an intention to preserve Germany as a political unit, just as the
Potsdam Protocol clearly states an intention to treat it as an economic unit. 56 The only remaining, and indeed the most likely, possibility is that the Soviet Union was merely recognized as the occupying power in its zone of occupation.
Assuming this is the correct interpretation of the Soviet Union's
de jure authority in East Germany, the House of Lords should then
have inquired into the status of the German authorities in that zone
before and after the creation of the German Democratic Republic.
Although a full discussion of this problem would be beyond the
proper scope of this Comment, it is not unrealistic to suppose that
the situation in East Germany before the establishment of a central
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id., Part II A9(iv), at 29.

See note II supra.
See note 49 supra.
Protocol of the Proceedings of the :Berlin Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, Part II 1314,
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY 1944-1961, op. cit. supra note 52, at 33.
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state was probably not radically different from that prevailing in
the Western zones. The Soviet authorities have interfered more
drastically and more frequently with Germany's political life but,
on the administrative side, they too seem to have allowed the continued and gradually expanded functioning of domestic German
authorities. 57 With respect to the Western zones, it is the generally
accepted view of German courts and writers that acts of German
authorities even before the creation of a central state are not to be
treated as acts of the occupation authorities unless they were done
pursuant to a direct, specific order of the latter.58 Do we have to
deal differently with acts of East German authorities because in
the course of time they became increasingly Communist-dominated
and thus brought into line with the Soviet occupation power? It
is not easy to assess the legal significance that is to be attached to
the indubitable political conformity which the Soviets imposed on
the German territory under their control. In West Germany, acts
of the East German authorities before as well as after the creation
of the German Democratic Republic have always been considered
as acts of German rather than Russian bodies. 59 Neither the fact
that basic political freedoms have been denied the people in East
Germany nor the fact that the German Democratic Republic is not
recognized by the West German government has precluded this
conclusion. To be sure, it would not have been altogether unreasonable to argue that the German Communists representing the
East German regime are in such a state of political subordination
that even in legal terms they must be viewed as simply the long
arm of the Soviet Union. It might be difficult though, once this
argument is accepted, to avoid the consequence of treating on an
equal basis all those East European countries which had been allied
with Germany during World War II. This, however, has never
been done in the post-war period, during which time such nations
were clearly relegated to the status of more or less dependent satellites of the Soviet Union. It must be remembered that, at least prior
to the Paris peace treaties of 1947,60 these countries were Soviet-occupied territory and that consequently the Communist regimes in
such countries as Rumania or Hungary emerged from essentially
the same conditions of Soviet occupation as did the East German
regime. Nonetheless, in the international community, these countries have never been treated as agents of the Soviet Union. The
57. See FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 51, at 60-61, 76-80, 101, 104-06.
58. See Muench, Entscheidungen nationaler Gerichte in voelkerrechtlichen Fragen:
Deutsche Rechtsprechung 1951-1957, 21 ZEITSCHRIET FUER AUSLAENDISCHES OEFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VoELKERRECHT 510, 535-41 (1961); 22 id. 729, 766-69, 774-79 (1962).
59. See 21 id. at 510, 567-75.
60. Peace Treaty with Rumania, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1649;
Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 1915, T.I.A.S. No. 1650; Peace
Treaty with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, 61(2) Stat. 2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651.
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case for distinguishing East Germany from them is not an easy one,
although conceivably a distinction could be based on the argument
that, unlike the East European countries, East Germany comprises
only part of a nation which was separated from the rest of that
nation against its will and in violation of international agreement
as expressed in the Potsdam Protocol.61
At any rate, it is at least regrettable that the House of Lords did
not find it necessary to discuss the exact meaning of "recognition"
of the Soviet Union as a de jure authority in East Germany in view
of the specific circumstances of Germany's status under allied occupation. Its failure to do so accounts for another serious shortcoming
of the opinions. Nowhere do the judges discuss the consequences
(other than proper authority of plaintiff's solicitors) which may
flow from their view of the East German situation. Since they do
not even hint at possible differences between the "recognition" at
hand and the more common recognition of a new state or a change
in government or territory, one is left wondering whether all of
the activity in East Germany will now be treated in English courts
exactly as if it had happened in the Soviet Union's own territory.
More particularly, does the act-of-state doctrine apply to acts of
expropriation effected by the East German regime on the theory
that these acts must be considered as having been done by an agent
of the Soviet Union, the recognized de jure authority? As formulated
by American courts, the act-of-state doctrine is inapplicable to acts
of unrecognized states as well as to extra-territorial acts.62 Therefore, if the German Democratic Republic were viewed realistically,
that is, as a German state which is not recognized by the West, it
probably could not benefit from the doctrine. However, if the
theory of the House of Lords is followed, it seems hard indeed to
avoid its application.63 This consequence is of particular significance
in the Zeiss case itself now that it has been sent back to the trial
court for litigation on the merits.
61. See VON MUENCH, DAS VOELKERRECHTLICHE DELIKT IN DER MODERNEN ENTWICKLUNG
DER VOELKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFI' 89-90, 98-102 (1963).
62. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Subsequent
to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, the operation of the act-of-state
doctrine in this country has of course been further limited by the Hickenlooper
Amendment. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2161 (1964).
63. Conceivably, one could argue that acts of the authorities in East Germany,
even though the House of Lords attributes them to the Soviet Union for purposes
of recognition, are, for purposes of the act-of-state doctrine, still to be distingnished
from acts performed by the Soviet Union on its own territory, simply because the
Soviet Union is not the actual sovereign in East Germany but merely an occupation
power. The fact that neither the Western allies nor the Soviet Union have allowed
the Hague Regulations to govern their occupation regime in Germany, see note 47
supra, cannot mean that they claimed to be the German sovereign. Were it otherwise,
the disclaimer of annexation, see note 49 supra, would make no sense.
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VI. THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE Zeiss CONTROVERSY
Undeniably, the Zeiss controversy poses a serious dilemma to the
courts in a common-law country. For a long time they have been
committed to the doctrine that no effect can be given to acts of a
government which the forum refuses to recognize. Supposedly, this
doctrine is designed to avoid embarrassment of the forum's executive branch of government which bears the primary responsibility
for the conduct of a nation's foreign affairs. One may wonder, however, why the courts in civil-law countries have never felt the need
for such a sweeping doctrine; when they refuse to enforce acts of
an unrecognized government, this is usually done on the basis of
public policy considerations as applied to the circumstances of the
particular case. The Swiss Zeiss decision illustrates this approach
rather well.134 The Swiss Bundesgericht points out that non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic does not prevent it from
applying East German law. In the first place, the court argues, giving effect to that law could never be taken as recognition in the
international law sense because a judge has no power to grant such
recognition. Second, conflict of laws rules must be understood to
refer to the law which is actually enforced in the foreign territory
to which they point.65 Then, turning to a consideration of the merits
of the case, the court engages in a process of frankly weighing the
equities between the two rival organizations. Although the decision
in favor of the East German party has been criticized, such criticism
is not based on the fact that the German Democratic Republic is
not recognized by Switzerland, but rather because it was felt that
the court had not taken into account all of the relevant considerations in assessing the competing claims of the parties. 66
Is the attitude exemplified by the Swiss Zeiss case liable to produce better results than the traditional position of the English courts
with respect to unrecognized governments? To a large extent, the
answer seems to depend on how realistic the recognition policy of
the forum's executive is. If the forum government is willing to
recognize a new regime once it has gained effective control over
most of a state's territory and this control is likely to continue,67
little harm will follow from the English doctrine. On the contrary,
64. See VEB Carl Zeiss Jena v. Firm.a Carl Zeiss Heidenheim, .Bundesgericht,
March 30, 1965, 91 II Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen .Bundesgerichtes 117
(Switz.).
65. Id. at 126-27.
66. See Schaumann, Entschaedigungslose Konfiskationen vor dem Schweizerischen
Bundesgericht: Eine Aenderung der Rechtsprechung, 62 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 33 (1966).
67. These factors were officially stated to be the test which determines the British
recognition practice. See Statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons,
March 21, 1951, supra note 37. But it has been flatly stated that "reality does not bear
out the theory of British practice." Greig, supra note 22, at 128.
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it may have the advantage of concentrating the difficult and delicate
fact-finding process concerning the political situation in a foreign
country by entrusting it to the Foreign Office which supposedly
has relatively easy access to all the relevant information and possesses
the expertise necessary for an informed judgment. However, it is no
secret that in current state practice recognition of a new regime
is often delayed for many years even though the regime may be
firmly established. 68 Where such a discrepancy exists between the
facts which allegedly determine recognition and the actual recognition practice, a court may find it embarrassing to follow strictly
the English doctrine. Thus, American courts have seen fit to deviate
from that doctrine, but the cases are not entirely consistent.69 Civil
law courts, on the other hand, untrammeled by any broad rule relating to unrecognized regimes, will encounter no serious difficulty
in dealing with this situation. They can enforce acts of the unrecognized regime when they feel that by doing so substantial justice
will be done, regardless of the political nature of the foreign regime;
and, on the other hand, they can refuse enforcement of an act which
is politically tainted or, for any other reason, contrary to a strong
public policy of the forum.
Reading the Zeiss opinions of the House of Lords and of the
Court of Appeal, one cannot help feeling that neither court faced
up to reality. Paraphrasing in part the words of Lord Wilberforce,70
it might be said that the Court of Appeal treats East Germany as
a legal vacuum whereas the House of Lords fills this vacuum with
a fiction. Undoubtedly, legal fictions can serve useful purposes, but
they should be used sparingly, if only because they have a tendency
to mislead the unwary and the less sophisticated. Before a judge
resorts to this device, he should ask himself whether the situation
can be dealt with in more realistic terms. More specifically, the
House of Lords should have analyzed the East German situation
with a view to the interests underlying the Western policy of nonrecognition of the German Democratic Republic. It could have
easily discovered that this policy is primarily designed to achieve
two interrelated objectives. First, it supports the West German government's claim to be the only freely constituted representative of
the German people. 71 Second, it buttresses the position that the
Soviet Union has continuing responsibilities with respect to Ger68. BRIERLY, supra note 28, at 140; 1 O'CoNNELL, supra note 31, at 175.
69. See note 22 supra.
70. See note 23 supra.
71. The Foreign Secretary's second certificate, see note 25 supra, incorporated an
earlier communique by the three Western Foreign Ministers to the effect that "the
three governments consider the government of the Federal German Republic as the
only German government freely and legitimately constituted and, therefore, entitled
to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international
affairs."
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many as a result of the joint military occupation and the various
agreements with the Western allies. 72 The court then should have
considered the adverse effects which each of the alternative holdings
might have on the pursuit of these objectives. In view of the fact that
West German courts enforce East German legislative, judicial, and
administrative acts as long as their substance is not repugnant to
the forum's public policy, it is hard to see why similar treatment
by an English court would undermine the Western position that
only the West German Government is entitled to speak for Germany. The same is true mutatis mutandis with respect to the second
objective of the Western non-recognition policy: giving effect to
East German acts that are unrelated to Soviet responsibilities in
Germany is quite consistent with the view that such responsibilities
still exist. If this is correct, the result reached by the House of Lords
can be justified without taking refuge behind the highly artificial
fiction on which the court relies.
The crucial question of course is whether this result is more
in keeping with our notions of justice and fairness than the decision
of the Court of Appeal. It must be kept in mind that we are merely
dealing with the preliminary issue of whether the plaintiff has duly
authorized its solicitors. Since the Court of Appeal disregards East
German legislation in its totality, the plaintiff, functioning under
such legislation as it does, 73 could not be heard in an English court
if the Court of Appeal had been affirmed. Clearly, the House of
Lords regarded this as an undesirable outcome. The court's effort
to give plaintiff a chance to be heard on the merits seems quite
understandable and may win it applause. However, in West Germany, the decision has already been termed "a bitter pill for
Bonn,'' 74 and this it might turn out to be if, but only if, the reasoning of the House of Lords should have the consequence of making
the act-of-state doctrine applicable in all its rigor. 75 Considerations
which make it appropriate to allow the plaintiff a hearing on the
merits, call for an equal treatment of the defendants which would
hardly be satisfied if the act-of-state doctrine is applied as a consequence of the House of Lords' holding in the Zeiss case.76 It is sub72. For a discussion of the theory of agency developed by Secretary of State Dulles,
see notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Bull, "Bittere Pille fuer Bonn," in Die Zeit, July 19, 1966, p. 15. A similar
disposition was inflected in East Germany by Feige & Reichrath, Das Zeiss-Urteil des
House of Lords-eine eindeutige Ablehnung der westdeutschen Ausschliesslichkeitsanmassung, 20 NEUE JuSTIZ 549 (1966). But while it may be a bitter pill for Bonn to
learn that East German legislation is enforced in an English court, it might not be
pure candy for the East German communists to be told that this is done merely because their state is a subordinate agency of the Soviet Union. Significantly, the article
by Feige & Reichrath, supra, does not mention this reasoning at all.
75. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
76. The effect of applying the act-of-state doctrine would be to prevent the court
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mitted that the most desirable result would be that both parties
have an unrestricted opportunity to present their case on the merits,
and surely that could not be a disaster for anyone.

Herbert L. Bernstein
from examining without restrictions those acts of expropriation, which in view of
the Zeiss litigation in other countries, see notes 8 & 9 supra, appear to be crucial to
the defendants' case.

